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THE CAPITAL MARKET CONSOLIDATION ACT AND THE KOREAN FINANCIAL 
MARKET
By Kim Dong-hwan
Background of the Legislation
After the Asian fi nancial crisis of 1997, the Korean 
government geared up to carry out fi nancial restruc-
turing. As a result, the number of domestic fi nancial 
institutions stood at almost half the number before 
1997, but their asset size, soundness, and profi tability 
were greatly improved. For example, the total assets of 
banks had increased to 1,400 trillion won by the end 
of 2006, a remarkable upgrade compared with 600 
trillion won in 1997. In spite of the massive fi nancial 
restructuring, however, the Korean fi nancial industry 
is still weak in such areas as profi t structure, business 
models, effi ciency, and productivity. This is especially 
true for various fi nancial institutions related to the 
capital market—that is, fi nancial investment com-
panies (FICs)—that have yet to be fully developed. 
By contrast, banks have played a signifi cant role in 
creating a market for the private placement of debts 
and in the derivatives markets.
The domestic capital market has failed to grow at a 
rate commensurate with the pace and size of the real 
economy in Korea, a fact that can be easily ascertained 
by comparing the growth of the capital market with the 
extent to which other major countries have deepened 
their capital markets (Figure 1). For example, the ratio 
of market capitalization over GDP reached just 87.3 
percent in 2005, as the domestic equity market was 
unable to play a signifi cant role in economic develop-
ment. By contrast, the market capitalization ratios of 
developed countries such as Japan, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Taiwan all exceeded 100 
percent.
Corporate financing through capital markets also 
continues to shrink; the amounts of fi nancing through 
equities and corporate bonds have decreased to 7 tril-
lion won and 48 trillion won, respectively—almost half 
the levels of fi ve or six years ago. Moreover, domestic 
FICs are far less developed than domestic commercial 
banks in their business size, restructuring performance, 
and profi tability. For example, return on equity (ROE) 
of commercial banks was 19.6 percent in the middle of 
2005 (Figure 2), which is greater than that of securities 
companies and asset management companies by 12.5 
percent and 14.1 percent, respectively.
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Figure 1: Equity Markets in Selected 
Countries, 2005 (market capitalization/GDP, 
percentage)
Source: Financial Investment Services and Capital 
Markets Act (Seoul: Ministry of Finance and 
Economy, 2007), www.mofe.go.kr/.
There are also some defi ciencies in the existing fi nan-
cial regulatory regimes for FICs. For example, differ-
ent regulations are applied to the same function, such 
as fi nancial investment services (FISs) and fi nancial 
investment products (FIPs), when carried out by differ-
ent types of fi nancial institutions. FICs cannot supply 
FISs and FIPs freely if they are not specifi cally enu-
merated in the law. And the existing fi nancial regimes 
are not equipped with suffi cient measures to protect 
investors from the misfeasance of FICs.
For these reasons, the Capital Market Consolidation 
Act (CMCA), that is, the Financial Investment Ser-
vices and Capital Markets Act, was promulgated on 
3 August 2007, and is scheduled to enter into effect 
in February 2009. This law will integrate the existing 
14 fi nancial business laws, such as the Securities and 
Exchange Act, the Futures Trading Act, and the Trust 
Business Act, into one.
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Major Changes Made by the CMCA
The CMCA aims to:
• Comprehensively defi ne the concept of FIPs by 
integrating the existing laws concerned,
• Allow FICs to operate more than two FISs,
• Take proper measures to protect investors,
• Strengthen regulations on unfair transactions in the 
capital market,
• Raise the competitiveness of FICs through special-
ization and extension, and
• Improve and maintain the institutional groundwork 
for facilitating the capital market as well as for 
developing the fi nancial industry.
Generally speaking, the purposes of the CMCA are 
twofold. One is to improve the effi ciency of the do-
mestic capital market through improvements in the 
regulatory regime that promote not only innovation 
of FIPs and FISs but also competition among FICs. 
The other is to enhance the reliability of the capital 
market by protecting investors from misfeasance or 
negligence on the part of FICs, enhancing the transpar-
ency of FICs’ internal decision-making process, and 
strengthening the rights of shareholders. In short, the 
CMCA is intended to further upgrade the domestic 
capital market, which means the creation of a capital 
market “big bang” in Korea. The CMCA is expected 
to bring about four major changes.
Shift to a Functional Regulatory Regime
The existing institutional regulatory regime will be 
changed into a functional one by adopting a “same 
regulation for the same function” approach; that is, the 
same regulation will be applied to the same fi nancial 
function without regard to the type of FICs that are 
running FISs and providing FIPs. First, various sorts 
of FISs stipulated in the existing 14 kinds of fi nancial 
business laws will be classifi ed into six categories 
of fi nancial businesses according to their economic 
nature, which includes dealing, arranging deals, man-
agement of collective investment assets, discretionary 
and nondiscretionary investment advisory services, 
and trust services.
Prudential regulations, such as those specifying capital 
adequacy and restrictions on transactions with major 
shareholders, will be streamlined and applied to all 
FICs. And general regulations such as duty of good 
faith, prohibition of loss compensation, and the KYC 
(know-your-customer) rule will be applicable to all 
FISs. At the same time, individual regulations will be 
formulated by taking into account the unique nature 
of each FIS; for example, dealers should not make 
self-contracts, and discretionary and nondiscretionary 
investment advisory fi rms should not make loans.
Introduction of a Comprehensive System
The existing positive-list regulatory regime will be 
revised into a negative-list, or comprehensive system, 
with a broad-based defi nition of FIPs. Until now, FICs 
could deal only in legally enumerated securities and 
derivatives, which are the only ones that enjoy in-
vestment protection. For example, there are 21 items 
of eligible securities, including government bonds, 
municipal bonds, special bonds, corporate bonds, 
stocks, investment certifi cates, benefi ciary certifi cates, 
mortgage-backed securities, equity linked warrants, 
and equity-linked securities. But the CMCA will re-
write the defi nition of FIPs to encompass all kinds of 
securities and derivatives having investment value.
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Figure 2: Profitability by Financial Services 
Sector in South Korea (Return on Equity), 
2001 and 2005, percentage
Source: Financial Investment Services and Capital 
Markets Act (Seoul: Ministry of Finance and 
Economy, 2007), www.mofe.go.kr/.
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That is, every fi nancial product will be classifi ed as 
a FIP or non-FIP according to the possibility of loss 
on the invested principal; non-FIPs such as deposits 
do not entail the possibility of principal loss. FIPs 
will be reclassifi ed into general fi nancial products 
such as securities and risky fi nancial products such 
as derivatives, according to the possibility of loss ex-
ceeding principal. Securities are defi ned as fi nancial 
products with a risk of losing the invested principal, 
and derivatives are defi ned as investment products 
with the risk of incurring liabilities in addition to loss 
of the invested principal. Derivatives will be classi-
fi ed into exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives according to the trading channel, such as 
a stock exchange. Hence securities, OTC derivatives, 
and exchange-traded derivatives are included in the 
revised concept of FIPs.
The scope of underlying assets of derivatives and 
securitized derivatives will also be broadened in order 
to encompass all FIPs and other natural, environmen-
tal, and economic risks in addition to the existing 
underlying assets such as currencies, commodities, 
and credit risk.
Expansion of Business Scope
The CMCA will allow FICs to conduct all six FISs 
under one roof by eliminating the business functions 
that have been strictly separated among different FISs. 
At the same time, the CMCA will establish a Chinese 
wall between these six FISs in order to prevent con-
fl icts of interest caused by concurrent execution of 
FISs. Sales networks will be expanded by applying an 
“introducing broker” system that allows brokers to sell 
FIPs entrusted by FICs; this system offers investors 
a variety of channels to FIPs, and brokers will solicit 
investment by connecting investors and FICs.
The scope of asset management services will also be 
diversifi ed by expanding collective investment scheme 
(CIS) vehicles and CIS-managed assets. In addition to 
existing forms such as investment trusts and limited 
companies and partnerships by private offerings, CIS 
vehicles will be expanded to the extent permitted 
under the civil or commercial codes: limited liability 
companies and limited partnerships by public offering, 
anonymous partnerships, and general partnerships. 
The scope of CIS-managed assets will be expanded 
from assets such as securities, futures, real estate, 
tangible property, commercial paper, insurance claims, 
and fi shing and mining rights to include assets with 
any investment value, such as intellectual property 
rights. The CMCA will also allow FICs to offer retail 
payment services and registered foreign exchange 
transactions.
As the scope of business is expanded, the regulation 
will be stricter; for example, the process of applica-
tion for authorization and registration will become 
rigorous, especially when FISs and FIPs are risky and 
clients are not professional investors.
Upgrading the Investor Protection Mechanism
The CMCA will upgrade the investor protection func-
tion by eliminating loopholes in the existing investor 
protection provisions and by institutionalizing inves-
tor protection regimes in line with global standards. 
The CMCA will introduce a regulation on investment 
solicitation, under which FICs are obligated to provide 
investors with detailed explanations of the underlying 
risks of FIPs when they are soliciting investment. FICs 
will be held liable for losses and damages incurred by 
investors in the event of noncompliance with the pro-
vided guidance. The CMCA will introduce the KYC 
rule: prior to solicitation, FICs should interview and 
profi le potential investors to obtain information such 
as their net worth, the purpose of their investment, and 
their investment experience.
Investors are divided into two groups—professional 
and nonprofessional investors—depending on their fi -
nancial capacities to take on investment risks. A princi-
ple of suitability will be applied to the nonprofessional 
investors who are relatively weak in risk taking and 
hedging; FICs will be obligated to protect investors, 
offer investments tailored to investor profi les, and act 
in good faith and provide thorough explanations about 
the investments. For professional investors, the pro-
tections will be less stringent. Investment solicitation 
through real-time methods like visitation and phone 
calls will be permitted only when investors authorize it 
because unsolicited calls or unwanted solicitation may 
infringe on the privacy of potential investors.
FICs should establish a system to prevent confl icts of 
interest, which are defi ned as actions that pursue the 
interests of FICs or other investors at the expense of 
the interests of certain investors. To prevent confl icts 
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of interest, FICs are obliged to set up internal controls 
to disclose any confl ict of interest to investors and to 
create separate organizations or prohibit employees 
from holding more than one position if serious con-
fl icts of interest are deemed to exist.
Infl uence of the CMCA
The CMCA is expected to expedite a convergence 
and consolidation of FICs, during which advanced 
investment banks (IBs) or a few securities-oriented 
financial groups with global competitiveness are 
expected to appear and realize economies of scope 
and scale in the capital market. A single FIC will be 
able to create synergy from service integration and 
strengthen competitiveness by offering a multitude 
of FIPs because it can conduct all IB business and 
expand opportunities by sharing customer information 
from each respective business under one roof. For 
example, corporate fi nancing activity such as arrang-
ing mergers and acquisitions can be carried out more 
effi ciently and generate higher profi ts if the fi rm can 
invest some of its own funds or funds raised from its 
asset management business.
Of course, banks and insurance companies would 
not remain idle spectators. They would seek to ac-
quire FICs, such as securities or asset management 
companies, as cash cows that would be expected to 
improve their growth and profi tability via revenue 
diversifi cation and business magnifi cation. During 
this process, a few bank-oriented fi nancial groups and 
insurance-oriented fi nancial groups are expected to 
appear in order to occupy the “blue ocean”—i.e., the 
FISs created by the CMCA. These kinds of fi nancial 
groups would also try to set up business models in line 
with advanced IBs and become leading competitors 
in the domestic capital market. At the same time, a 
cluster of small and medium-size commercial banks, 
insurance companies, and FICs could then emerge, 
through cross-shareholding or in the weaker form of a 
strategic alliance, and pursue the leaders by competing 
and cooperating with each other. Foreign capital will 
penetrate the domestic market and merge with FICs 
that are allowed to offer various fi nancial services, 
including retail payment services.
There are expected to be structural changes in fi nancial 
market competition. The existing fragmented market 
competition will evolve into an integrated one (see 
Figure 3) that would accelerate competition between 
different types of fi rms such as banking vs. commerce 
and domestic vs. foreign. Competitive integration 
between banks and securities companies, insurance 
and asset management companies, and securities and 
asset management companies would both deepen and 
widen the domestic capital market. Competition for 
niche markets would also heat up because the CMCA 
would stimulate revision of the existing positive-list 
regulations, including the Bank Law and the Insur-
ance Business Law, into negative-list and functional 
regulations under which every fi nancial institution 
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Figure 3: Structural Changes in Competition in Korea, before and after the Capital Market 
Consolidation Act (CMCA)
Source: Author’s concept, 2006.
                 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS              43
would enter niche markets in pursuit of profi t op-
portunities, regardless of size and business area, FIC, 
or non-FIC.
The infl uence of institutional investors would increase 
as FICs become bigger and focus their business on un-
derwriting, even if their business models are currently 
concentrated on brokerage. Equity and bond markets 
would fl ourish as FICs reinforce their fi nancial inter-
mediary functions through developing and offering a 
variety of custom direct and indirect FIPs. Deregula-
tion of CIS vehicles and private equity funds would 
also reinforce the fi nancial intermediary functions of 
FICs, which would help foster many innovative small- 
and medium-size fi rms and venture businesses. The 
asset-backed securities and derivatives markets would 
fl ourish as demand for derivatives and securitized 
derivatives increase in order to meet the demands for 
risk taking and hedging.
The infl uence of the CMCA on fi nancial consumers 
would be positive because the investment products and 
channels would be more diverse and consumers would 
recognize the risk of their investments. However, 
fi nancial consumers and FICs might be involved in 
legal disputes if the positive effects of diversifi cation 
are offset by insuffi cient or misleading explanations 
about investment responsibility or risk. Despite the 
negative effects, the weight of equity among total 
fi nancial assets held by households is expected to rise 
to 6–7 percent in 2010 (Table 1).
The CMCA may also have some negative effects on 
the money market and banks. The CMCA is accel-
erating a “money move” toward securities and fund 
markets before its entry into force, which may increase 
the liquidity risk of the short-term money market by 
increasing the volatility of securities companies’ call 
loans and by reducing the availability of bank credit. 
A drastic move from bank deposits to cash manage-
ment accounts of securities companies may further 
lower the growth and profi tability of banks, which 
have been suffering from a structural decrease in net 
interest margin and a “race to the bottom” in the fee 
business, such as fees for bank trusts.
Furthermore, the trust business of banks will be weak-
ened as the CMCA consolidates the Trust Business Act 
under which banks could have operated bank trusts as 
fee businesses. Banks will encounter obstacles in the 
conduct of derivatives business because they must 
obtain a new license as prescribed by the CMCA; now 
they cover 98 percent of the OTC derivative market 
and can sell listed products such as deposit derivatives 
and bond derivatives as ancillary businesses without 
an additional license.
Some Remaining Issues
Several issues still remain. The first of these—
integrating all fi nancial services laws on the basis of 
the negative-list and functional approach created by 
the CMCA—can be addressed in an amendment to 
the CMCA, but the other remaining issues should be 
resolved before the act goes into effect.
First, unlike the CMCA, the existing fi nancial regula-
tions applied to non-FICs such as banks and insurance 
companies are based on the positive-list and the insti-
tutional system. These kinds of dual or heterogeneous 
regulation systems might generate an uneven playing 
fi eld or regulatory arbitrage. If banks (or insurance 
companies), for example, choose to run fi nancial 
investment services, they would be regulated by both 
the CMCA and the Bank Law at the same time. Banks, 
unlike securities companies, cannot freely develop and 
Table 1: Structural Change of Household Financial  
Assets in Korea, 2005 and 2010 (est.)  
in billions of won and percentage 
Financial 
assets 
2005 2010 (est.) 
Billions
of won Percentage
Billions
of won Percentage
Cash 37,346 3.3 51,796 3.3 
Deposits 626,879 54.9 819,256 51.5 
Life 
insurance 
and
pensions
234,665 20.6 379,861 23.9 
Short-
term 
bonds
8,318 0.7 19,366 1.2 
Long-
term 
bonds
106,362 9.3 97,897 8.2 
Equity 62,827 5.5 90,831 6.2 
Other 65,491 5.7 83,305 5.7 
Source: Korea Institute of Finance, 2007. 
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sell derivative products because they are restricted by 
the positive-list banking laws. To solve these dual-
regulation problems, all the fi nancial services laws 
applied to FICs and non-FICs should be integrated 
based on the negative-list and the functional approach 
created by the CMCA.
The full integration of fi nancial business laws will need 
to proceed according to principle-based approaches in 
order to guarantee legal consistency in regulatory ob-
jectives and instruments, facilitate fair and transparent 
competition, and ensure balance and stability in the 
fi nancial system. The new Consolidation Law should 
defi ne the core business of each fi nancial institution, 
under which all kinds of fi nancial businesses can 
be concurrently run except the core business. This 
approach would also help reduce systemic risk and 
prevent the adverse effects of a reckless rush into 
universal banking.
Second, the CMCA would permit securities companies 
to run a retail payment service with the proviso that 
agency banks undertake its net settlement process, 
which might give rise to some problems. There are two 
kinds of payment systems: wholesale and retail. The 
former adopts the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) 
method, which does not fail to settle all transactions 
but entails high liquidity costs. The latter adopts the net 
settlement or deferred net settlement (DNS) method, 
which can save liquidity costs but has the fatal defect 
of possible settlement failure and systemic risks. It is 
the very reason that the CMCA adopts the provisos. 
However, such a conditional permission for securities 
companies’ participating in the retail payment system 
does nothing but give them the right to a free ride on 
the fi nality of the payment system, that is, protection 
of principal and immediate payment, which might 
threaten the stability of the entire fi nancial system.1 
There are no countries where securities companies 
can directly participate in the payment system. This 
is because retail payment services linked with demand 
deposits and loans are one of the traditional banking 
services.2
Third, the CMCA permits in-house FIC management 
of all six categories of FISs with a certain level of a 
fi rewall. However, the fi rewall provisions between 
securities companies and asset management compa-
nies are too abstract to prevent the confl icts of interest 
caused by unfair use of customers’ information and 
property. Hence, it could be necessary to install more 
concrete and effective prevention measures, espe-
cially against the in-house management of collective 
investment assets by securities companies. Because 
on-site supervision over confl icts of interest is almost 
impossible, it might be better to not permit in-house 
management of collective investment assets.
Fourth, the existing trust business act is to be abolished 
and integrated into the CMCA. When this happens, 
all kinds of trust businesses will be classifi ed as fi -
nancial investment services and carried out by FICs. 
It is unreasonable to regard every trust business as a 
fi nancial investment service, however, because many 
trust businesses do not engage in fi nancial investment 
services. Most trust businesses should be promoted and 
regulated by the commercial code; at most, the CMCA 
can regulate the investment trust business.
Dr. Kim is Chief, Financial Industry Research Division 
of the Korea Institute of Finance.  
1. The payment system is often compared with a two-sided market; that is, a system operator supplies a platform or a network, on 
which network users such as drawers and payees meet together. The properties of the payment system can be explained by network 
externalities and economies of scale. These two properties can make the market fail since the former causes a free rider problem 
and the latter a natural monopoly. In the case of a retail payment system, securities companies—network users—do not want to bear 
the cost for making the system safe, they only want to enjoy its benefi ts. 
2. E. G. Corrigan, “Are Banks Special?” Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1982; Mark W. Olson, “Are Banks 
Still Special?” (paper prepared for conference of the Institute of International Bankers, Washington, D.C., 2006).
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